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Abstrat: We introdue a model for deentralized networks with ollaborating peers. The model is based on
the stable mathing theory whih is applied to systems with a global ranking utility funtion. We onsider the
dynamis of peers searhing for eient ollaborators and we prove that a unique stable solution exists. We
prove that the system onverges towards the stable solution and analyze its speed of onvergene. We also study
the stratiation properties of the model, both when all ollaborations are possible and for random possible
ollaborations. We present the orresponding uid limit on the hoie of ollaborators in the random ase.
As a pratial example, we study the BitTorrent Tit-for-Tat poliy. For this system, our model provides an
interesting insight on peer download rates and a possible way to optimize peer strategy.
Key-words: P2P, stable marriage theory, rational hoie theory, ollaborative systems, BitTorrent, overlay
network, mathings, graph theory
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Stratiation dans les Réseaux Pair-à-Pair
Appliation à BitTorrent
Résumé : Cet artile vise à introduire un nouveau modèle d'analyse des réseaux déentralisés basés sur des
ollaborations entre pairs. Ce modèle repose sur la théorie des mariages stables appliquée à des systèmes
possédant une fontion d'utilité globale. Nous étudions la dynamique induite par la reherhe pour haun des
meilleurs partenaires possibles et montrons un théorème d'existeneuniité. Nous observons une rapide vitesse
de onvergene et étudions le phénomène de stratiation dans la solution stable, dans le as où le graphe des
ollaborations réalisables est omplet et dans elui où il est aléatoire. Pour le as aléatoire, nous présentons une
limite uide de la solution.
Comme exemple pratique, nous étudions la politique donnantdonnant employée dans le logiiel de partage
BitTorrent. Pour e système, notre modèle fournit des intuitions pertinentes sur les vitesses de téléhargements
ainsi que sur les possibilités d'optimisation des paramètres.
Mots-lés : pair-à-pair, mariages stables, hoix rationnels, systèmes ollaboratifs, BitTorrent, réseaux overlay,
ouplages, graphes
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1 Introdution
Motivation Collaboration-based distributed appliations are suessfully applied to large sale systems. A
system is said to be ollaborative when partiipating peers ollaborate in order to reah their own goal (inluding
being altruisti). Apart from well-known ontent distribution appliations [4, 5℄, ollaborating an be applied
to numerous appliations suh as distributed omputing, online gaming, or ooperative bakup. The ommon
property of suh systems is that partiipating peer exhange resoures. The underlying mehanism provided
by protools for suh appliations onsists in seleting whih peers to ollaborate with to maximize one's peer
benet with regards to its personal interest. This mehanism generally uses a utility funtion taking loal
information as input. One an ask if this approah an provide desirable properties of ollaboration-based
ontent distribution protools like salability and reliability.
To ahieve these properties, the famous protool BitTorrent [4℄ implements a Tit-for-Tat (TFT) exhange
poliy. More preisely, eah node knows a subset of all other nodes of the system and ollaborates with the
best ones from its point of view: it uploads to the ontats it has most downloaded from in the last 10 seonds.
In other words, the utility of peer p for node q is equal to the quantity of data peer q has downloaded from
p (in the last measurement period). The main interest in using the TFT poliy is the resulting inentive to
ooperate. The nature of the utility funtion then leads to a lustering proess whih gather peers with similar
upload performanes together, alled stratiation.
Reently, muh researh has been devoted to the study of the phenomenon. So far, however, while it has been
measured and observed by simulations, it has not been formally proved. Understanding stratiation is a rst
step towards a better omprehension of the impat of the utility funtion on a system behavior. A theoretial
framework to analyze and ompare dierent utility funtion is needed: hoosing a utility funtion that best suits
a given appliation is quite diult. More importantly, it is not lear whether the utility funtions implemented
lead to desirable properties. We introdue a generi framework that allows an instantiation of (known and
novel) utility funtions that model ollaboration. We further present a thorough analysis of a lass of utility
funtions based on global ranking agreements, suh as that of BitTorrent TFT poliy. This framework also ts
gossip-based protools used by a peer to disover its rank [8℄.
Contribution First, we propose a model based on the stable mathing theory. This model desribes deen-
tralized networks where peers rank eah others and try to ollaborate with the best peers for them.
Seond, we fous on systems with a global ranking utility funtion (eah peer has an intrinsi value) in the
framework of stable mathing. We prove that suh a system always admits a unique stable solution towards
whih it onverges. We verify through simulations the speed of onvergene without and with hurn (arrivals
ans departures).
Third, we study stratiation in a toy model of fully onneted networks where every peer an ollaborate
with all other peers. If every peer tries to ollaborate with the same number of peers, we observe disjoint
lustering. But with a variable number of ollaborations per peer, lustering turns into strong stratiation.
Fourth, we desribe stratiation in random graphs. For Erdös-Rényi graphs, the distribution of ollaborat-
ing peers has a uid limit. This limiting distribution shows that stratiation is a salable result.
Lastly, we propose a pratial appliation of our results to the BitTorrent TFT poliy. Assuming ontent
availability is not a bottlenek in a BitTorrent swarm, our model leads to an interesting haraterization of the
download rate a peer an expet as a funtion of its upload rate. This desription leads to possible strategies
for optimizing the download for a given upload rate.
Roadmap In Setion 2 we dene our model. Setion 3 presents a study on the problem dynamis. Setion 4
desribes stratiation in a omplete neighborhood graph and Setion 5, in random graphs. Setion 6 disusses
the appliation of our results to BitTorrent and Setion 7 onludes the paper.
2 Model
P2P networks are formed by establishing an overlay network between peers. A peer ats both as a server and a
lient. Eah peer p has a bounded number b(p) of ollaboration slots. As the network evolves, peers ontinuously
searh after new (or better) partners. Eah protool has its own approah to handling these dynami hanges.
For example, a protool like eDonkey [5, 1℄ optimizes independently two preferene lists on the server and on
the lient sides. More reent protools, like BitTorrent [4℄, make a use of a game theoreti approah, where
eah peer tries to improve its own payo. It results in keeping one preferene list per node.
RR n° 0123456789
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Let us suppose that eah peer p has a global mark S(p), whih may represent its available bandwidth, its
omputational apaities, or its shared storage apaity. Eah peer wants to ollaborate with best partners
who have highest marks S(p). This models many networks preferenes systems, albeit not all networks have
suh ranking. For instane, in hess playing, players have an intrinsi value (ELO rating), although they don't
generally want to engage people far better or worse than them.
Some peers might not be willing to ooperate with some others. For instane, peers that have no ommon
interest or are unaware of eah other. We introdue an aeptane graph to represent ompatibilities. A pair
(p, q) belongs to the aeptane graph if, and only if (i) both peers are interested in ollaboration. Without
loss of generality, we an suppose aeptability is a symmetri relation: if p is unaeptable for q, q will never
be able to ollaborate with p so we an assume q is also unaeptable for p. We denote by onguration or
mathing the subgraph of the aeptane graph that represents the eetive ollaboration between peers. The
degree of a peer p in a onguration is bounded by b(p).
A bloking pair for a given onguration is a set of two peers unmathed together wishing to be mathed
together (even if it means dropping one of their urrent ollaborations). A onguration without bloking pair
is said to be stable. In a stable onguration, a single peer annot improve its situation: it is a Nash equilibrium.
If a number of olloborations is limited to 1, the problem is known as the stable roommates problem [7℄.
It is an extension of the famous stable marriage problem introdued by Gale and Shapley in 1962 [6℄. If we
assume eah peer p wants to ollaborate with up to b(p) other peers, the framework is alled stable b-mathing
problem
1
[3℄.
As it holds for all theories of stable mathings, the existene of a stable onguration depends on the
preferene rules used to rank partiipant and on the aeptane graph. In this work we study the impat of the
rules derived from a global ranking on a peer-to-peer network behavior. In partiular, we nd the properties of
the stable ongurations.
3 Existene and onvergene properties of a stable onguration
Global ranking mathing is one of the simplest ases of mathing problems. Tan [13℄ has shown that existene
and uniqueness of stable solutions were related to preferene yles in the utility funtion. A preferene yle
of length k is a set i1, . . . , ik of k distint peers suh that eah peer of the yle prefers its suessor to its
predeessor. As proved by Tan, a stable onguration exists i there is no odd preferene yle of length greater
than 1. He also proved that if no even yle of length greater than 2 exists, then the stable onguration is
unique. If peers have an intrinsi value, no strit preferenes yle an our (see below for ties), so a global
ranking mathing problem has one and only one stable solution.
This solution is very easy to ompute knowing the global ranking S, b and the aeptane graph. The proess
is given by Algorithm 1: eah peer p starts with b(p) available onnetions. First, the best peer p1 piks the
best b(p1) peers from its aeptane list. As p1 is the best, the hosen peers gladly aept (reall the aeptane
graph is symmetri) and the resulting ollaborations are stable (no bloking pair an unmath them). Note
that if there is not enough aeptable peers, p1 may not satisfy all its onnetions. Peers hosen by p1 have one
less onnetion available. Then seond best peer p2 does the same, and so on. . . By immediate reurrene, all
onnetions made are stable. When the proess reahes the last peer, the onnetions are the stable onguration
for the problem. As it was said before, all onnetions are not neessarily satised. For instane, if the last
peer still has available onnetions when its turn omes, his onnetions will not be fethed, as all peers above
him have by onstrution spent all their onnetions. This is, of ourse, a entralized algorithm, but we shall
see below that deentralized algorithms work as well.
Note on ties Ties in preferene lists make the mathing problems more diult to resolve [11℄ without
bringing more insight about the stratiation issues studied in this paper. Simulations have shown our results
hold if we allow ties, but equations are hard to prove as existene of a stable mathing annot be guaranteed.
Thus for the sake of simpliity, we shall suppose utilities are distint, that is S(q) 6= S(p) for any p 6= q.
Convergene One an ask what is the point in studying a stable onguration in a dynamial ontext suh
as P2P systems, where peers arrive and depart whenever they wish, and where utility funtions and aeptane
lists an utuate. We have not proved yet that the proess of peers trying independently to ollaborate to the
best peers they know an reah the stable state.
1
in this paper the word mathing stands for b-mathing (unless otherwise stated)
INRIA
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Algorithm 1: Stable onguration in global ranking
Data: An aeptane graph G with n peers, a global ranking S(p), and maximal number of onnetions
b(p)
Result: The unique stable onguration of the b-mathing problem
Let a be a vetor initialized with b
for eah peer i sorted in inreasing S(p) (best peer rst) do
for eah peer j sorted in inreasing S(p) starting just after i do
if (i, j) ∈ G and a(i) > 0 and a(j) > 0 then
onnet(i, j)
a(i) = a(i)− 1
a(j) = a(j)− 1
end
end
end
We introdue the onept of initiative to model the proess by whih a peer may hange its mates. Given
a onguration C, we say that peer p takes the initiative when it proposes to other peers to be its new mate.
Basially, p may propose partnership to any aeptable peer. But only bloking pairs of C represent an inter-
esting new partnership. If p an nd suh a bloking mate, the initiative is alled ative beause it sueeds in
modifying the onguration (both peers will hange their set of mates).
To nd a bloking mate, p ontats peers from its aeptane list. We identify several strategies depending
on how p sans its aeptane list:
best mate when the peer selets the best (if any) available bloking mate. This happens if p knows the rank
of all its aeptable peers and whether they will ollaborate or not,
deremental when the list is irularly sanned starting from the last asked peer. This happens if p knows
the rank of all its aeptable peers, but not if they will ollaborate,
random when a single peer is seleted at random. This happens if p has no information on its neighbors until
it asks.
Of ourse, when best mate initiative is possible, it seems to be the best strategy to maximize a peer's own
prot, but it supposes a good knowledge of the system is maintained.
We an now omplete our model with initiatives: starting from any initial onguration, an instane of
our model evolves beause of initiatives taken by peers. In fat, it an only evolve towards the unique stable
onguration, as shown by Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 The stable solution an be reahed in B/2 initiatives, where B =
∑
p b(p) is the maximal number
of onnetions. Moreover, any sequene of ative initiatives starting from any initial onguration eventually
reahes the stable onguration.
Proof: In Algorithm 1, eah onnetion an be obtained by initiative. As the stable onguration possesses
up to B/2 pairings, this ensures the rst part of the theorem. We prove the onvergene by showing a sequene
of ative initiatives an never produe twie the same onguration. There is a nite number of possible
ongurations, so if we keep altering the onguration through initiatives, we eventually reah a onguration
that annot be altered with any initiative: the stable onguration.
The proof is indeed simple. If a sequene of initiatives indues a yle of at least two distint ongurations,
then one an extrat a preferene yle of length greater than 3: let p1 be a peer whose mates hange through
the yle. Call p2 the best peer p1 is unstably paired with during the yle, and p3 the best peer p2 is unstably
paired with during the yle. p1 is not p3 and p2 prefers p3 to p1, otherwise the pair {p1, p2} would not break
during the yle. Iterating the proess, we build a sequene of peer (pk) suh that pk prefers pk+1 to pk−1, until
we nd i < j suh that pi = pj . The irular list (pi, pi+1, . . . , pj−1) is a preferene yle. As global ranking
does not allow preferene yles, this is not possible, so a sequene of ative initiatives an never produe twie
the same onguration. 
Theorem 1 proves that in stati onditions (no join or departure, onstant utility funtion), a P2P system
will onverge to the stable state. To prove this stable state is worth studying, we have to show onvergene
RR n° 0123456789
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Figure 1: Starting from C∅, onvergene towards the stable state for dierent parameters
is fast in pratie (Algorithm 1 is optimal in number of initiatives but diult to implement in a large sale
system) and an sustain a ertain amount of hurn. As a omplete formal proof of this is beyond the sope of
this paper, we used simulations.
In our simulations, peers were labeled from 1 to n (the number of peers). These labels dene the global
ranking, 1 being the best peer and n the worst (if i < j, peer i is better than peer j). We use Erdös-Renyi loopless
symmetri graphs G(n, d) as aeptane graphs, where d is the expeted degree (eah edge exists independently
with probability
d
n−1 ). Only 1-mathing was onsidered.
For measuring the dierene between two ongurations C1 and C2 we use the distane
D(C1, C2) = Σ
n
i=1‖σ(C1, i)− σ(C2, i)‖.
2
n(n+ 1)
,
where σ(C, i) denotes the mate of i in C (by onvention, σ(C, i) = n+ 1 if i is unmated in C).
D is normalized: the distane between a omplete mathing and the empty onguration C∅ is equal to 1.
The disorder denotes the distane between the urrent onguration and the stable onguration.
At eah step of the proess we simulate, a peer is hosen at random and performs a best mate initiative (the
initiative an be ative or not). To ompare simulations with dierent number n of peers, we take a sequene
of n suessive initiatives as a base unit (that an be seen as one expeted initiative per peer).
A rst set of simulations is made to prove a rapid onvergene when the aeptane graph is stati. In all
simulations, the disorder quikly dereases, and the stable onguration is reahed in less than nd initiatives
(that is d base unit). Figure 1 shows onvergene starting from the empty onguration for three typial
parameters: (n, d) = (100, 50), (n, d) = (1000, 10), (n, d) = (1000, 50).
Then we investigate the impat of an atomi alteration of the system. Starting from the stable onguration,
we remove a peer from the system and observe the onvergene towards the new stable onguration. We observe
big varianes in onvergene patterns, but onvergene always takes less than d base units and disorder is always
small. Note, that due to a domino eet, removing a good peer generally indues more disorder than removing
a bad peer. This is shown by Figure 2. We ran the simulations 100 times and seleted four representative
trajetories, as we did not wish to average out interesting patterns.
Finally, we investigate ontinuous hurn. A peer an be removed or introdued in the system anytime,
aording to a hurn rate parameter. Simulations show that as the hurn rate inreases, the system beomes
unable to reah the instant stable onguration. However, the disorder is kept under ontrol. That means
INRIA
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Figure 2: Starting from the stable state, we remove a peer and observe the onvergene towards the new stable
state. (1000 users, 1-mathing, 10 neighbors per peer)
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Figure 3: Starting from C∅, we observe distane to the instant stable state with dierent hurn levels (1000
users, 1-mathing, 10 neighbors per peer)
the urrent onguration is never far from the instant stable onguration. The average disorder is roughly
proportional to the hurn rate (see Figure 3 for typial patterns).
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All these simulations lead to the same idea: the stable onguration ats like a strong attrator in the spae
of possible ongurations when ollaborations are established using intrinsi values for judging peers Studying
the properties of the stable onguration is the next step.
4 Stratiation with omplete aeptane graph
We start studying the stable onguration in the speial ase where everybody is aeptable for everybody.
Hene the aeptane graph is omplete. This is a suitable, but not salable, assumption for small systems.
Complete aeptane graph is a toy model for highlighting stratiation eet.
4.1 Clustering in onstant b-mathing
Constant b-mathing is an instane of the b-mathing problem where every one tries to onnet to at most b0
peers (b0 is a onstant). Sine the aeptane graph is omplete, the stable onguration is very simple. It
onsists in a sequene of omplete subgraphs with b0+1 elements starting from the best peer (the remainder, if
any, is a trunated omplete subgraph). For example, gure 4 shows this lustering for the 2-mathing problem
on a omplete graph.
1 2 3 4 5 6 3k + 1 3k + 2 3k + 3
Figure 4: Limit ase of b-mathing and total knowledge : the ollaboration graph is a set of b+1 lusters. Here
b = 2.
As it has already been pointed out [2℄, full lustering in le sharing networks indues poor performanes.
Many designers try to produe overlay graphs with small world properties: almost fully onneted, high lus-
tering oeient, low mean distane, and navigable suh that shortest paths may be greedily found. But in
le sharing networks, having a ompliant overlay with nie properties (onnetivity, distanes, resiliene) is
useless if the eetive ollaborations graph has none of the desired properties. In our example, although the
knowledge graph is a omplete graph, ollaboration established through global ranking satters the graph in
lusters. Hene ontent is sealed inside lusters, and singularities are bound to our.
Lower bound for number of slots in BitTorrent
As we have just spoken of lustering, it is interesting to remember that a onneted graph of n vertex has at
least n− 1 edges. As a b0-regular graph has
b0
2 n edges, it is impossible for a 1-regular graph to be onneted,
and the yle is the unique 2-regular onneted graph. It follows that it is better to set b0 ≥ 3.
This gives a rst basi insight for the fat that the default number of slots per user is 4 is BT (less for very
small onnetions and more for high bandwidth ones): given the generous extra slot, put less than 4 slots in
the default lient would make the TFT ollaboration graph disonneted whih would seriously harm the BT
eieny.
Of ourse, BT is more ompliated, and this is just a by-passing remark. In Setion 6 we propose further
arguments to see why 4 seems to be the number of onnetions the average lient should set by default.
4.2 Stratiation in variable b-mathing
b0-mathing is not the most ommon ase in pratie. The lustering from Figure 4 may be a onsequene of
the spei parameters used. Indeed, adding only one onnetion an alter a set of omplete subgraphs of size
b0 + 1 in one unique onneted omponent (see Figure 5  settings are same than for Figure 4 exept that an
extra onnexion has been granted to peer 1).
In fat, both Figures 4 and 5 are not typial. In our simulations on omplete aeptane graphs, we generally
observed many large onneted omponents. If we assume that b is distributed aording to a rounded normal
distribution N (b¯, σ2) (mean b¯, variane σ, all samples are rounded to the nearest positive integer), we observe a
surprising phase transition. As soon σ is big enough to produe heterogeneous samples (σ ≈ 0.15), the average
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Figure 5: b-mathing plus one extra onnetion: the graph is onneted
onstant b0-mathing normal N (b¯, σ
2)-mathing with σ = 0.2
b0 or b¯ 2 3 4 5 6 7 2 3 4 5 6 7
Average Cluster Size 3 4 5 6 7 8 6 20 78 350 1800 11000
Max Mean Oset (MMO) 1.67 2.5 3.2 4 4.71 5.5 1.33 2.10 2.52 3.21 3.65 4.31
Table 1: Clustering and stratiation properties in a omplete knowledge graph.
onneted omponent size explodes, then stays almost onstant. The luster typial size after the transition
seems to grow fatorially with b¯ (Figure 6 shows what happens for b¯ = 6). Computed values appear in Table 1.
Fatorial luster size growth grants the existene of a giant onneted omponent when b¯ is large and n
remains bounded. This solves the lustering issue.
Nevertheless, distanes in the obtained ollaboration graph are another question. A good estimate is given
by Mean Max Oset (MMO) whih desribed the mean ranking oset between one peer and its further neighbor
in the ollaboration graph. The larger the MMO, the fewer hops needed to link two peers with very dierent
intrinsi value in the same onneted omponent. Remark that in b0-mathing, MMO is easy to ompute (it is
enough to ompute it on the b0 + 1 omplete graph). We show that it onverges to:
MMO(b0) =
1
b0+1
(b0 + (b0 − 1) + . . .+
⌈
b0
2
⌉
+ . . .+ b0)
−−−−−→
b0→+∞
3
4b0.
When b is variable, MMO beomes less obvious to ompute. However, simulations show that MMO reets
the same phase transition as the luster size does. In ontrast, as luster size explodes, MMO dereases, has
shown by Figure 6 and Table 1.
The onlusion of this rst approah on omplete graphs is that whereas the lustering problem an be
handled, a stratiation issue exists: peers only ollaborate with very lose to them, whih an make ontent
diusion ineetive.
5 Global ranking on random aeptane graphs
In this setion, for the sake of simpliity, we rst desribe a 1-mathing model. This allows us to explain our
independene assumption and to present the related mathematial results. We then extend the equations to the
b0-mathing ase, for any onstant number b0 of onnexions.
5.1 Model
As noted in Setion 3, there exists a unique mathing (stable onguration) where no peer an loally improve
its mates among its known peers; this mathing, denoted P in the following, an be obtained simply by applying
algorithm 1. As we rst fous on 1-mathing, we denote P (i) the mate of Peer i in P .
5.1.1 An exat formula
Denote by D(i, j) the probability that Peer i is mathed with Peer j over all possible graphs with n verties.
In other words D(i, .) is the distribution of the peer mathed with i.
Obviously, D(i, j) = D(j, i) and D(i, i) = 0. The total order property an be written as follows, for i < j:
D(i, j) = pP("i is not with better than j" and "j is not with better than i") where p is the probability that
peer i knows peer j.
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Figure 6: Inuene of σ for the b-mathing global ranking problem when b follow a normal law N (6, σ). The
dotted line represents the Mean Cluster Size, the plain line stands for Mean Max Oset. The left part (when
σ = 0) is the ase of onstant 6-mathing
We an rewrite the above probability as: P(P (i) ≥ j)× P(P (j) ≥ i|P (i) ≥ j), leading to the exat formula:
D(i, j) = p(1−
j−1∑
k=1
D(i, k))P(P (j) ≥ i|P (i) ≥ j). (1)
Note that this does not depend on the number of peers. The formula an thus be extended to every ouple
(i, j) ∈ (N∗)2.
Lemma 1
∀i ∈ N∗,
∞∑
k=1
D(i, k) = 1.
This lemma means that, under the Erdös-Rényi assumption, when adding a large number of peers at a lower
rank, any peer will eventually nd a mate with probability one.
Proof: The onditional probability does not go to 0: We rst show that P(P (j) ≥ i|P (i) ≥ j) does
not go to 0. Suppose that j > i, then ondition on Ei = {P (1), ..., P (i− 1)},
P(P (j) ≥ i|P (i) ≥ j|Ei) =


empty onditioning if i ∈ Ei
0 if j ∈ Ei(and i /∈ Ei)
x ≥ p if j /∈ Ei and i /∈ Ei.
The last inequality holds beause if j /∈ Ei and i /∈ Ei, then knowing that P (i) ≥ j, i and j are linked if
and only if there exists an edge between both. Sine P (j) = i implies as a partiular onsequene P (j) ≥ i, the
inequality is satised.
Now, all we have to show is that P(j ∈ Ei|i /∈ Ei) does not tend to 1 when j tends to innity. This is
obvious sine for some k < i, the funtion j → P(P (k) = j|i /∈ Ei) gives probabilities of disjoint events so that∑∞
j=1 P(j ∈ Ei|i /∈ Ei) ≤ i− 1; the general term thus tends to 0 and ertainly not to 1.
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D is a probability We know that for a given i, D(i, j) are the probabilities of disjoint events. Thus
D(i, j) −−−→
j→∞
0. From formula (1) we dedue
j−1∑
k=1
D(i, k) −−−→
j→∞
1.

5.1.2 Approximation: independent 1-mathing model
Hereinafter we shall adopt the following assumption:
Assumption 1 the two events:
 peer i is not with a peer better than j,
 peer j is not with a peer better than i,
are independent.
Assumption 1 is reasonable when the probability that i and j have a ommon neighbor is very low. It entails
that (1) an be replaed by the approximate reurrene relation:
D(i, j) = p
(
1−
j−1∑
k=1
D(i, k)
)(
1−
i−1∑
k=1
D(j, k)
)
(2)
This formula an easily be omputed in an iterative way by alulating for inreasing i the probabilities
D(i, j) from j = 1 to n using Algorithm 2 (see Algorithm 3 for the b0-mathing ase).
Algorithm 2: Independent 1-mathing probability omputation
Data: Number of peers, n
Erdös-Rényi probability, p
Result: D(i, j) the probability user i hooses user j
D ← zeros(n, n)
for i = 1 to n do
for j = i+ 1 to n do
D(i, j)← p
(
1−
∑j−1
k=1D(i, k)
)(
1−
∑i−1
k=1 D(j, k)
)
D(j, i)← D(i, j)
end
end
Example where the simplied formula does not work Even if the approximation made by using (2)
instead of (1) works very well for small values of p (see gure 9), it in not an exat formula. Example in Figure
7 illustrates this point: we onsidered 3 peers; then we an write down all the possible graphs (8 of them) with
the exat probability for eah event.
5.2 Main result on the independent 1-mathing model
This setion presents mathematial results that follow from assumption 1. When the number of peers is large,
the model sales and the normalized histogram of neighbors tends to a ontinuous distribution and yields an
equation satised in this limit. Indeed the empirial distribution also onverges, whih means that every instane
of an Erdös-Rényi graph is very likely to behave like the typial ase of the above assumption, as shown by the
simulations below.
We are able to prove some parts of this program but must leave the remainder as onjetures for further
work. The results bring onsiderable insight.
From a pratial point of view one only need to retain two points from the mathematial developments:
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Figure 7: Approximation error: for n = 3, there is 8 possible graphs. Exat mathings probabilities are
 D
exat
(1, 2) = p
 D
exat
(1, 3) = p(1 − p)
 D
exat
(2, 3) = p(1 − p)2
Algorithm 2 leads to the same exept
D(2, 3) = p(1−D(2, 1))(1−D(3, 1))
= p(1− p)(1− p(1− p))
= D
exat
(2, 3) + p3(1− p)
 for not moderate values of n, there exists a saled version of D(i, j) whih does not depend on n (see 5.3),
 the shape of D(i, j) is present in almost any given n-peers system.
5.2.1 Distribution weak onvergene
Notation, Hypotheses: For all theorems and proofs of this setions, G = (V,E) is an Erdös-Rényi graph,
P is its unique stable pairing, and Mi(n, p) is the distribution of the mate of peer i:
Mi(n, p) =
∑
j∈[|1,n|]\{i}
D(i, j)δj .
The mean degree of a peer is denoted d.
Theorem 2 Mi(n, p)
∗
−−−−→
n→∞
Mi(p) with :
 Mi(p) ∈ P(Z),
 on the restrited support [|1, n|]: Mi(n, p)(dx) =Mi(p)(dx).
Theorem 3 (Dira limit) We look at the probability Mi(p)(ndx) on the spae (
1
n
N,Pn) where Pn puts prob-
ability 1 on points of 1
n
N. As a measure on R,
1
n
P
n
tends to the Lebesgue measure on R
+
for weak onvergene;
we thus have our rst saling: given p and n→∞:
∀p,Mi(p)(ndx)
∗
−−−−→
n→∞
δ0.
Conjeture 1 (Fluid limit) n→ ∞, pn = d
n
onsider peer number in = 1 + ⌊nα⌋; then there exists Mα,d ∈
P(R) that is absolutely ontinuous with respet to Lebesgue measure suh that:
µnα,d :=Min(p
n)(ndx)
∗
−−−−→
n→∞
Mα,d.
Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2 is obvious exept for the fat thatMi has mass 1; the result essentially omes from the fat that the
probability for peer i to be mathed with peer j does not depend on peers with rank greater than the maximum
of i and j. Thus the distribution for n peers is only a ut version of the distribution with more peers.
Now we shall prove that the mass is equal to 1. We already know that the mass is equal to 1 for the exat
model (Lemma 1). However, it is not obvious this is still true after the hanges we made to the toy model. The
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fat that Mi(n, p)→Mi(p) gives the mass as an inreasing limit. First, suppose the mass Mi(n, p) does not
tend to 1. Then there exists some ǫ > 0, suh that
∑∞
k=1 D(i, k) < 1 − ǫ. If we put this bak in formula (2),
then:
D(i, j) ≥ pǫ
(
1−
i−1∑
k=1
D(k, j)
)
(3)
We know that (D(i, j))j=1..∞ is a sub probability, thus D(i, j) → 0 when j → ∞. From equation (3)
it follows that
∑i−1
k=1 D(k, j) → 1. A partiular onsequene is that for j large enough (i.e., there exist
j0, suchthatforallj ≥ j0), we have:
∑i−1
k=1 D(k, j) ≥
1
2 but this is impossible sine the i − 1 sequenes
(D(k, j))1≤k<i;j=1..∞ are probabilities.
Proof of Theorem 3
The result is obvious sine all the mass stays in ompat sets (tightness property on the Polish spae R) and
Mi(p) is a probability. But the fat is interesting for its physial interpretation.
Sketh of proof of Conjeture 1
This is a very tehnial result. We will only address here the speial ase where α = 0. From a tehnial point
of view, we rst have to prove that the sequene µn is tight, whih allows us to extrat a limit. We then have
to show that this limit is unique.
In the speial ase α = 0, let β ∈ R and jn = 1 + βn⌊n⌋ then: D(1, jn) = pn (1− pn)i
n−1
. This implies
nD(1, jn) ∼ d
(
1−
dβ
nβ
)nβ
→ de−βd.
This in turn yields:
M0,d(dβ) = de
−βddβ.
This theoretial result ould be proven though at the expense of very long and tehnial developments. We do
not antiipate any signiant mathematial diulty though it does remain to arry through the demonstrations.
The results are not neessary to make the following observations, but they explain why we have onsidered some
partiular salings.
5.3 Observations
The results in this setion are obtained by solving Equation 2. We took n = 5000 to obtain the smoothest
possible urves but n = 100 would give pretty similar results. In Figure 8 we illustrate the dierent ases that
may arise.
In Figure 8(a) we see the ase of a well ranked peer. Note that for i = 1 the right part is almost geometrially
distributed. Also note that the best peers are peered with peers of lower average rank, but that this hanges
quikly and peers in the top 20% but not in the top 5% have a signiantly better mate on average.
The entral ase is illustrated in Figure 8(b). We see that the distribution is symmetri and that the
distribution simply shifts with the rank of the peer (for top 25% to top 80% peers). This seond fat is a kind
of nite horizon property and illustrates the property we alled stratiation. Notie that the distribution an
not be t with a normal law, in any ase.
In Figure 8(), the distribution shift ontinues for the bottom 20% of peers, but as there is no worse peer to
mate with, the distribution is ut. This means that there is a probability for not being mathed whih is given
by the area lled in blue. A partiular ase for the worst peer is that it will be mathed exatly in half of the
ases. All the others are assured to do better in terms of mathing frequeny.
5.4 b0-mathing independent model
The 1-mathing ase was only presented to give a avor of the stratiation phenomenon. Formally there are no
new issues in progressing to a b0-mathing model exept for the weight of notation. As for 1-mathing, we state
an independene assumption whih is not formally true but supplies a fairly good approximation ompared to
simulations as shown in paragraph 5.4.3.
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Figure 8: Distribution of neighbors in independent 1-mathing for n = 5000 peers and p = 0.5% for Peer 200,
Peer 2500 and Peer 4800.
5.4.1 Notation
n still denotes the number of peers. The situation beomes more ompliated, beause the rst hoie of one
peer may orrespond to the last hoie of its mate. Consequently we have to study a quantity Dcjci (i, j) whih
is not of diretly interest. This is the probability that hoie number ci of Peer i is j and that for j, i is hoie
number cj. As in the 1-mathing ase, Dcjci (i, j) does not depend on larger indexes for i, j, ci and cj. Nor does it
depend on n. Intuitively this orresponds to the fat that the rst hoie is made before making the seond, and
that the best peers have priority for hoosing their mates. The quantity of interest is Dci(i, j) =
∑b0
cj=1D
cj
ci (i, j).
Assumption 2 Let i, j ≤ n and ci ≥ 1 and cj ≥ 1, the events:
 peer i has hosen ci− 1 peers better than j and hoie ci is not mathed by better than j,
 peer j has hosen cj − 1 peers better than i and hoie cj is not mathed by better than i,
are independent.
The way to evaluate Dcjci (i, j) is to multiply the probabilities of the supposed independent events:
 i knows j: with probability p,
 hoie ci of i is not mathed and previous hoies are mathed with better than j,
 the reiproal ondition on j.
Note that the probability that hoie ci of i is not mathed and previous hoies are mathed with better
than j is simply:
∑i−1
k=1 Dci−1(i, k)−
∑i−1
k=1 Dci(i, k), the probability that hoie ci − 1 is mathed with better
than j minus the probability that hoie ci is mathed with better than j (mathematially this formula is exat
beause one of the two events is inluded in the other).
This proves, under assumption 2, that:
Dcjci (i, j) = p
(
j−1∑
k=1
Dcj−1(j, k)−Dcj(j, k)
)(
i−1∑
k=1
Dci−1(i, k)−Dci(i, k)
)
. (4)
We now show how to ompute this formula by reurrene.
5.4.2 Independent b0-mathing algorithm
Note in the following algorithm that Dc(i, j), the c-th hoie distribution of i is no longer symmetri for c > 1,
but Dcjci (i, j) has more symmetry (see Algorithm 3). Matlab sripts an be found at [10℄. This version is not
optimized (but suiently diult not to do so); the partial sums an be kept in memory to gain a linear fator.
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Algorithm 3: Independent b0-mathing probability omputation
Data: Number of peers, n
Erdös-Rényi probability, p
Number of mathings, b0
Result: Dcjci (i, j) the probability that the ci-th hoie of Peer i is j and that the cj-th hoie of j is i and
Dc(i, j) the probability that the c-th hoie of Peer i is j
Dc ← zeros(b0, n, n)
Dcjci ← zeros(b0, b0, n, n)
Dc0 ← ones(1, b0, n, n)
D0c ← ones(b0, 1, n, n)
for i = 1 to n do
for j = i+ 1 to n do
for (ci, cj) ∈ [|1, b0|]× [|1, b0|] do
Dcjci (i, j) ← p
(
j−1∑
k=1
Dcj−1(j, k)−Dcj(j, k)
)(
i−1∑
k=1
Dci−1(i, k)−Dci(i, k)
)
end
for ci = 1 to b0 do
Dci(i, j)←
∑b0
cj=1 D
cj
ci (i, j)
end
for cj = 1 to b0 do
Dcj(j, i)←
∑b0
ci=1D
cj
ci (i, j)
end
end
end
5.4.3 Validation of independent b0-mathing
As mentioned above, assumptions 1 and 2 work very well exept for very small numbers of peers with p very
large. Figure 9 illustrates this point. We simulated a 2-mathing by drawing a million realizations of the
Erdös-Rényi graph with n = 5000 and p = 1% (simulations requiring several weeks) and ompared distributions
D1(3000, j) and D2(3000, j) with those given by our simplied formula. The omparison in Figure 9 illustrates
the auray of the formula.
6 Appliation to BitTorrent
Results of previous Setions allow us to losely estimate for eah peer the ranks of peers it is likely to ollaborate
with. All our results tend to give a theoretial proof of the stratiation phenomenon in systems that use a
global ranking funtion that is not orrelated to the aeptane graph. In this Setion, we will see how this
stratiation an give insight about the eet of the Tit-for-Tat poliy used in BitTorrent.
We suppose that we are in the post ashrowd phase. In the ashrowd phase, an unique seed is uploading
a new le, and the upload apaities of the best peers are useless: all peers have downloaded the same bloks.
But during the post ash rowd phase, all bloks have roughly the same repartition, beause of the download
rarest rst poliy of BitTorrent. So we an assume ontent availability will not aet the aeptane graph and
fous on bandwidth only.
The TFT poliy onsists in uploading to the peers from whih one gets the best download rates. The
seletion proess is renewed periodially. Along with a generous upload onnetion that allows to probe new
peers for an eventual TFT exhange, this ats like the random peer initiative desribed Setion 2. This why we
laim our results apply to the TFT exhanges in BitTorrent. In peuliar, we have a proof of the stratiation
eets (peers tend to exhange with peers with similar bandwidths) empirially observed by [2, 9℄.
However, the ranking of a peer just gives an intuition about the Quality of Servie (QoS) it is presumed
to experiene. In order to obtain relevant results, it is therefore neessary to bind ranking and performane.
In the ase of a le sharing system like BitTorrent, the average expeted download rate is a very onvenient
RR n° 0123456789
16 Anh-Tuan Gai , Fabien Mathieu , Julien Reynier , Fabien de Montgoler
−800 −600 −400 −200 0 200 400 600 800
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
x 10−3
Ranking offset
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
First choice simulated
Second choice simulated
First choice estimated
Second choice estimated
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D1 and D2 for peer 3000 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Figure 10: Estimation of bandwidth apaities derived from [12℄
performane metri all the more so sine it is easy to ompute within our model: it is enough to know the
upload bandwidth for eah peer i.
To ompute network performanes, we have taken as referene the measurements made by Saroiu et al. [12℄.
Using bandwidth estimation in the Gnutella network, they have estimated the upstream for a large ommunity of
P2P users. The umulative distribution they obtained is shown Figure 10. One an observe a wide distribution
of bandwidths (just like in Orwell's Animal Farm, all peers are equal but some peers are more equal than
others).
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Figure 11: Expeted D/U ratio as a funtion of the upload bandwidth oered. b0 is set to 3 and average number
of neighbors is 20.
Applying our model to the distribution observed by Saroiu et al., we get the results shown in Figure 11. We
hose the following parameters:
 b0-mathing with b0 = 3, orresponding in a BitTorrent network with all lients having the default number
of slots of 4.
 expeted number of aeptable peers (peers who are known and interesting) d = 20 (realisti value)
Notie that the number n of peers does not have to be given beause our model does not depend on the
network size: with a partial network knowledge, observed osets sale with the number of peers (see Setion 5.1).
To put results in the learest possible way, we hose to represent expeted download/upload ratio, whih
orrespond to BitTorrent share ratio. When this ratio is lesser than 1, one gives in average more that it reeives.
Some observations are worth being said:
 Best peers suer from low sharing ratios: as they are the best, they an only ollaborate with lower peers,
so the exhange is suboptimal for them. The only way for best peers to ounter this eet is by adding
extra onnetions until the upload bandwidth per slot is lose to the one of lower peers. This somehow
explains why BitTorrent proposes by default a greater number of onnetions (up to TCP limitations) for
peers with high bandwidths, thus avoiding too muh spoil.
 There is density peeks in the bandwidth distribution. this peeks orresponds to typial Internet onne-
tions, suh as DSL or able. Peers in the density peeks have a ratio lose to 1. This is due to the great
probability they have to ollaborate with peers that have exatly the same harateristis as them.
 Eieny peeks appear for peers that have an upload just above a density peek. For these peers, lower
peers have almost the same upload bandwidth as them, whereas upper peers are likely to oer greater
bandwidth.
 Surprisingly, the lowest peers have a high eieny, although there is some probability for them not to
be mathed, as pointed out by Figure 8(). This is related to the relatively high bandwidth (ompared to
their) they an sometimes obtain: roughly speaking, they an obtain half the time four times their upload
bandwidth.
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As a onsequene of this eieny repartition, it is tempting for an average peer to tweak its number of
onnetion in order to inrease the eieny of its onnetions. For instane, suppressing one onnetion an
improve the probability of ollaborating with higher peers. However, this leads to a Nash equilibrium where
all peers have just one TFT slot. This is unaeptable in term of onnetivity, but rational peers trying to
maximize their benet annot be avoided. This is an explanation for the 4 slots (3 TFT and one generous
slot) settings: obedient average peers that uses the default settings must have at least 4 in order to ensure
onnetivity in the TFT ollaboration graph. On the other hand, the more slots they have, the farther they are
from the Nash equilibrium that rational peers will try to follow. Hene 4 seems to be the best trade-o.
7 Conlusion
In this paper, we identied the stable mathing theory as a natural andidate to model peer-to-peer networks
where peers hoose their ollaborators. Furthermore, we applied elements of this theory to a spei ase:
b-mathing with global rankings. Whereas there has been a lot of work in analyzing inentive to ollaborate in
some spei appliation from an eonomial point of view, this is the rst attempt to analyze the behavior of
a lass of appliations using graph theory.
The main onlusion of this study is that mathing theory gave insights on the behavior of a P2P systems
lass, namely the global ranking lass. In both ases of omplete and random aeptane graphs, we studied
lustering and stratiation issues. On most ases, lustering may be prevented using b-mathing with enough
onnetions and some standard deviation. But stratiation is an intrinsi property of suh networks. It seems
impossible to overome it as long as eah peer follows the try-to-ollaborate-with-the-best rule. Interestingly,
for random overlay graphs, the ruial parameter is d, the average number of aeptable peers, whih makes
stratiation a awlessly salable phenomenon.
As a rst appliation, our results provide some new insights on BitTorrent parameters. They show that
best peers have to set up a large number of onnetions in order to avoid bad download/upload ratio. The by
default number of ollaboration (4) is justied. It allows, to a ertain extend, to maintain onnetivity in the
TFT exhanges and to protet peers using default settings (obedient peers) from peers with optimized settings
(rational peers).
When onsidering the stable properties whih emerge, it also beome lear that dierent lass of utility
funtions leads to very dierent properties. This an be exploited aording to the needs of the targeted
appliation. For example, in a peer-to-peer streaming protool, the most important feature is a small play out
delay but a strong stratiation, needed to give peers inentive to ollaborate, produe a ollaboration graph
with large diameter (large play out delay). In many ases, ombining dierent utility funtion will be neessary.
Suh a ombination an, for instane, be ahieved by introduing a seond type of ollaborations depending on
a dierent global ranking or depending on a symmetri ranking suh as lateny.
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